AxisofLacan: Twitter as aesthetic-technical discipline
When writing this blog I have—so far—tried to avoid short note-like thoughts, or simple ‘stamp collecting’ reposts of links and information already available on other sites and blogs. The conscious rational for this has been—at least in part—that, not functioning in an academic context, I am unlikely to have any papers or books published anytime soon; and therefore, it is important to me that this blog stand up as ‘a work in itself’. This choice of phrase also—I think—points toward a second probably reason: my background as artist, which—for me at least—seems to make it an irresistible temptation to think of all production in terms ‘the work’, which therefore then demands a certain level of substance and consistency in order to function as such. This doesn't mean finished or complete, in fact, it is central to the form and purpose of this blog that it remain plastic, malleable and a ‘work in progress’—yet work [in progress] it remains, and as such requires a certain aesthetic ‘rightness’ (the definition of which will remain ambiguous, so as to leave space for the potential of the pathological).
This decision about the focus of this blog then, of course, appears to create a particular function for Twitter: a place for links, note-like thoughts, and immediate dialog. However: a) despite myself, I still get entangled in having tweets function with a phrased ‘rightness’ (they don't escape being ‘works’), and b) 140 characters is often just not enough to say many things that combine both being worth saying and relative complexity (although this does make for an interesting discipline).
I have an interest in the way contingent technical forms can ‘go beyond themselves’ and shape what can-or-can't-be-done, and what can-or-can't-be-said.
The technical 140 Twitter character limit was itself born of a similarly technical 160 character limit on SMS messages—in order that, in the early days, Twitter could ‘piggyback’ on the popularity and ubiquity of this service (with the remaining 20 characters being reserved for the Twitter username). Arguably Twitter has little need for the SMS service today, but, as is the nature of evolved systems, once it's there and built upon, you're stuck with it (unless it, and everything built upon it, becomes redundant). Nobody responsible for creating the SMS standard anticipated Twitter, yet their decision about what length a brief informal message should be, directly produced the technological reality that in turn formed a lower character limit for Twitter. Now, whilst I would expect that the 160 character SMS limit also has its own technical ‘ground’, it must in part be the length it is because that was considered, by its designers, to be an ‘ideal’ for this particular kind of communication.
Having used Twitter for a while now, I feel confident in saying that there is a fundamental difference between what—and how—you can communicate in 140 characters as opposed to 160. An analogy would be the disproportionate difference a change in financial income makes, when it is from earning at a level that just covers basic needs, to earning at any amount above this (until you find more expensive ‘basic needs’, of course).
An idle speculation that emerges is: what would the ‘tweet-o-sphere’ look like if the original technical limitation of the SMS platform had been different (or was never based on SMS)?
A practical question identified is: do I require some other platform in between Twitter and this blog (or to change my usage of this blog)?
A formal aesthetic result (‘the work’) is: an attempt, by myself earlier today, to explain via Twitter the Lacanian concepts of the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, in relation to Mark Fisher’s notion of ‘Capitalist Realism’. Although there was some discussion afterwards, my basic explication (I feel I am rather pushing the meaning of that work here) was 10 tweets long.
The tweet that started it all was:
Central to the efficacy of #CapitalistRealism is its genuine—objective—symbolic existence; in Lacanian terms, that's a tough nut to crack...
Which prompted a response:
AxisofElvis Axis of Elvis
@jonathanwaring say more ...
Resulting in those 10 tweets:
@AxisofElvis Very crudely, in the Lacanian triad: Real-Symbolic-Imaginary—the Real = the original trauma engendered by the failure of the…
@AxisofElvis …Symbolic order to ever fully represent either itself or the inaccessible Real. Imaginary = inner space of self-identification…
@AxisofElvis …the Imaginary has limited efficacy unless it can be translated into the social realm of the Symbolic—think of the derision…
@AxisofElvis …often provoked by the figure of the ‘Goth’ or ‘Wigger’ (at least, in part, the result of a mismatch between Imaginary…
@AxisofElvis …self-identification and the social Symbolic order). The Symbolic order structures social relations and social meaning, and so…
@AxisofElvis …in some ways, can be thought of as, paradoxically, the most ‘real’ of the three. Mark Fisher (@kpunk99) makes a good example…
@AxisofElvis …in Capitalist Realism apropos of Gerald Ratner—(almost) everyone knew the jewellery he sold was ‘crap’, but when he publicly…
@AxisofElvis …admitted this to the ‘big Other’—and thus inscribed it within the Symbolic order—he lost his job & the company lost millions.
@AxisofElvis It is in that sense that—irrespective of its inconsistencies and falsehoods—#CapitalistRealism is ‘a tough nut to crack’…
@AxisofElvis …as—viewed through a Lacanian ontology—it requires a ‘cracking’ of the Symbolic order itself.
In order to fit this explanation to the 140 character discipline, I wrote it out tweet-by-tweet (using Twitter's character counter) and then cut and paste it into a text editor, structuring the breaks where they more-or-less best fitted the sense being conveyed. I then cut and paste it back into Twitter and tweeted it consecutively, leaving no gaps for a reply, until the explanation cycle was finished.
I then swiftly apologised in advance, in case ‘say more ...’ hadn't really meant that much more. There then followed a more conversational form, but one in which the structural properties of the technological medium were still highly apparent.
Many questions remain (and answers, thoughts, and further questions are always welcome):
- Does my explanation of Lacan ‘work’ (both in terms of its theoretical accuracy, and in its aesthetic form)?
- Aside from the obvious social immediacy of Twitter, what might be gained through subordination to technical (and aesthetic) form?
- To what extent might subordination to an aesthetic sensibility relate to extrinsic factors, and to when might it be considered pathological?
Total GHAOS: 5th Anniversary
On this day, five years ago, following a campaign of street actions, 'raleighs' and worldwide stickering, the Dark Arts regime was finally overthrown. Cousins around the globe engaged their I.C.S. [Inner Conceptualising Space] and worked together to achieve the collective ideals of GHAOS and the ‘Reactor Party’: Total GHAOS was realised.
Total GHAOS was a microcosmic society built from scratch, a multi-storey scaffolding utopia (inside an otherwise unassuming—but spacious—light-industrial unit), and absolute replacement for the old world outside (which no longer existed).
Total GHAOS, Reactor (2005)
Entering Total GHAOS cousins left behind their old identities, timepieces, and mobile phones in order to begin their new lives. As GHAOS Actors [i.e. the audience] they sacrificed their own opinions to become cogs in the GHAOS machine. Hundreds of GHAOS Actors were required to perform simultaneously in order for the system to function, eliminating the last traces of REXist non-participation.
GHAOS Sticker Action, Toronto
Following an interview and bureaucratic processing, new cousins each received their workpass, badges and Party manifesto. They were then given their first role: perhaps it was the mundane but essential function of ‘unit clock’, counting out—by hand—the units of time that regulated work and play within the microcosm; or maybe their task was to replace the person who had interviewed them—the dynamics of authority becoming suddenly reversed, as they were themselves charged with interrogated newer arrivals (whilst bluffing through their own limited knowledge).
Total GHAOS encompassed hundreds of interlinked roles in its hierarchical system. Cousins could find themselves in the lower levels: working on the potato farm, or drafted into the army. Or perhaps, as a result of hard work in the badge-making factory (making badges for new cousins), they found themselves moving upward, gaining access to higher strata jobs and cultural activities: becoming curator of the Museum of GHAOTIC Artefacts; or a student at the GHAOS Art Institute (KIVPA). For the most committed GHAOS Actors even a seat on the Supreme Council was a possibility.
Group Exercises
But the dark suspicion of REXist deviance and non-participation was ever present. Taking their cue from the unblinking eyes of the ever-watchful LYNX (totem animal and emblem of the Reactor Party), cousins remained ever vigilant for the influence of Skepticus REX and the dark taint of REXimalism. Nobody was beyond suspicion, and cousins guilty of REXist behaviour risked re-education in the Arkwright Asylum.
Total GHAOS ran for three days, and when it finished it brought an end to the ‘Reactor Party’ and the two-year long—rhizomatically developed—GHAOS project. If you weren’t there, then our apologies cousin, but Total GHAOS was reached without you.
6 Unit Hate
I first worked with Reactor during the ‘Reactor Party’ campaign in the lead up to Total GHAOS. Following my experience working with Reactor on Total GHAOS I joined the group, initially as Secret Member (2005-2006) and then as a core member of the collective from 2006 until my departure at the end of 2009.
For the purposes of historical analysis, the GHAOS project website can be viewed at: www.ghaos.org
Reactor's more recent and current projects are documented over at: www.reactorweb.com
Summing Up: Žižek and Environmentalism (Part 1)
Before moving on to other topics, I am returning here once more to Žižek. Following my previous posts addressing his stance toward recycling, it seems appropriate to also consider his wider position with regards to something that I would term ‘environmentalism’, but which—in the following video clip—Žižek (incorrectly) refers to as ‘ecology’. Perhaps, by ecology he rather intends to mean ‘ecological movement’ (see: Wikipedia: Ecology Disambiguation), ecology itself being something quite distinct in meaning from environmentalism—see: Wikipedia: Ecology:
Ecology (from Greek: οἶκος, "house" or "living relations"; -λογία, "study of") is the scientific study of the distributions, abundance and relations of organisms and their interactions with the environment. Ecology includes the study of plant and animal populations, plant and animal communities and ecosystems. Ecosystems describe the web or network of relations among organisms at different scales of organization. ... Ecology is not synonymous with environment, environmentalism, or environmental science. Ecology is closely related to the disciplines of physiology, evolution, genetics and behavior.
In this video clip (from the 2008 film ‘Examined Life’ by Astra Taylor) Žižek’s basic position with respect to ‘environmentalism’—if not his actual opinions about specific environmental issues—become clear:
Žižek’s 10 minute section from ‘Examined Life’
Žižek stance is explicitly against the romantic conception of nature, and the related myth of the ‘natural’ as a ‘balanced harmony’. In fact, in his refusal of the term itself—‘there is no nature’—it seems that, for Žižek, nature is inescapably tainted with romanticism—with romantic ideology. ‘Nature’ is ideological in the sense that its very idea appears inescapably bundled together with a particular ‘attitude’ toward itself: this attitude is that it (nature) should be considered as an separate entity (separate from something which we must then presume to be ‘non-nature’); that it should be considered something ‘over there’, apart from us; and as something distinct in itself, static in its identity and therefore requiring ‘preservation’ from the encroachment of said non-nature. For an excellent explanation and expansion of this idea and its Hegelian roots, see Timothy Morton’s video ‘Beautiful Soul Syndrome’ (at 7:44)—I’d also highly recommend the other two parts in this series.
A common Žižekian theme is the identification of the political right with the notion that society was once a balanced harmonious system, with everything and everybody in its ‘proper place’ and—by extension—the idea that this perfection could once again be regained, were not for the external (‘virus’, ‘parasite’) or internal (‘cancer’) disruptive elements at odds with natural order of the social body. Be these disruptive threats identified in ideas (social, intellectual or political positions; artistic movements; or a more general notion of corruption of traditional values; etc.) or embodied in the idealisation of a specific group as disruptive in itself (Jew, other specific ethnic or religious group, immigrant, internal political subversive, ‘deviant’ etc.), in the imagination of the right they represent not only an obstacle to a return to Edenic harmony, but also further threaten what ‘still remains’ of it.
Žižek contrasts this with what he considers to be the position of a genuine left, which is constituted in an acknowledgement that class struggle exists as the inescapable base of all social orders.1 (See: For They Know Not What They Do, Preface to the Second Edition, note 16, p.xcv) Class struggle, in this sense, should not be thought of purely—as it popularly and simplistically is—as antagonisms of interest between crude monolithic-homogenous blocks (proletariat vs. bourgeoisie etc.), but rather—I would contend—between a profusion of both ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ classes, shifting and overlapping in their interests and therefore their various degrees of conscious and unconscious antagonism. Within this schema, individuals may exist in many classes simultaneously, and are not permanently fixed in their membership (it is crucial here not to make the error in thinking that this implies individuals are somehow in a position to ‘choose’ which classes they belong to—when this is properly understood the ideology at work in the idea ‘lifestyle’ becomes apparent). In this way a geniuine left recognises that, not only are our contemporary societies neither balanced nor harmonious, but that they never were, and never truly can be.
Following on from this acceptance, there comes an additional role for the left: the role of the social mediation of class antagonisms according to an egalitarian principle. It seems clear, from the acceptance of fundamental division, that such a mediating principle would be dialectical in character; for, despite any and every successful egalitarian mediation (though worthwhile in its own right) the process would never be able to fully ‘catch up’ with the fundamental and inescapable split which constitutes society itself.2
It is against the background of these ideas that Žižek’s opposition to the ideological mystification of ‘nature’ (or more precisely, the ideological mystification inherent in the idea of nature itself) should be read. Instead of the more commonplace line of one arguing for the removal of an unhelpful division between humankind and nature—that humans are ‘a part of nature’ and so should therefore seek to replicate or ‘live within’ nature's own ‘natural balance’—he instead maintains that ‘there is no nature’. By this he intends that, as with the myth of a balanced society, the myth of balance or harmony in nature is exactly that—a myth.
To what extent can his analysis be considered justified, and is there really a danger—as Žižek claims in the video—of environmentalism becoming ‘a new opium of the masses’?
In the second part of this post I will explore Žižek’s conceptions of ‘balance’ and ‘nature’ further—in the context of extinction events in Earth’s prehistory—and challenge this provocative claim.
Footnotes:- Given these definitions of left and right, it is worth noting the tendency for revolutionary movements of the left to shift almost immediately to an effective position of the right (albeit with a different foundational myth and symbolisation) upon taking power.↩
- It is worth thinking about this in relation to the debate between reform versus revolution. If no amount of mediation can equal an infinite mediation that would be required to heal that which cannot be healed (as it was never wounded in the first place), then why might a bigger step (revolution) any more appropriate than a series of smaller steps? (ongoing iterative reform). It is also worth considering how a society might correctly apprehend and assemble such an egalitarian principle in the first place.↩
Response to ‘Slavoj Žižek and the Recycling Superstition’
The response to my last post, ‘Slavoj Žižek and the Recycling Superstition’, has been gratifying. Following an @LSEpublicevents retweet, the post was picked up at Reddit by user Benkanoun, leading to a discussion of both of the issues raised in Žižek’s original lecture and—to a lesser extent—in my writing. Having developed into something much longer than I had originally intended, I am pleased that the post was of enough interest for so many to take the time to read it.
Having read the discussions, and also in light of my own thoughts on reading the post again, I have amended it slightly. These amendments address two key sections where I believe my meaning was not as clear as it could have been. Details of the changes and the original paragraphs can be found in the comments which follow the post.
In my second edit, I have also added a mention that—even sticking to my focus on the actions of the individual—recycling is in fact significantly less preferable than either reduction or reuse (the accepted ‘three Rs’ of sustainability—see Waste Hierarchy for an expansion and development of these). In order of minimising environmental impact, the hierarchy of preference is:
1. Reduce > 2. Reuse > 3. Recyle
It is interesting to note that while recycling generally gets a lot of attention (even if it is not practiced at anywhere near the level it could be), a lot less is said about the more preferable options of reduction and reuse. The key difference—and likely explanation—is that recycling is absolutely compatible with an ideology of perpetual economic growth based on ever increasing material consumption. You consume more; you recycle more. And—following Žižek’s reasoning—you can feel good about doing more of the former, just as long as you also do more of the latter. If recycling can be made profitable, then growth in the consumption of goods also creates a potential for growth in a market for recycling.
Whilst recycling can be made to turn a profit, reduction and reuse are at a basic level incompatible with this aim. Had Žižek pointed this out, then it seems likely he would have drawn less of the immediate negative reactions and confusion generated by his statements (mentioned at the beginning of my previous post). However this, I believe, would be to confuse his real point. His claim is more fundamental than simply saying that recycling is a diversion from other more worthwhile individual practices. Even if the elderly neighbour (referred to in the LSE lecture) honestly and diligently practiced reduction and reuse in the same way Žižek mentions her doing with recycling, this practice would still draw Žižek’s claim of superstition.
Žižek more profound point is to identify an operation of basic superstition involved in the very concept of personal action itself. Even individual action consciously directed at fundamental socio-political change is superstitious in these terms. This is why Žižek’s own invocation of the ‘paradox of the performative’ is in itself his superstition. As it is impossible for any individual to bring about systemic change by themselves, it follows that any doctrine of individual action that aims at systemic change necessarily invokes superstition. In simplistic terms—and to loose the subtlety of the concept—superstition here has a crude analogue in ‘leap of faith’.
It strikes me that Žižek’s is keenly aware of this limit point; the point beyond which our actions cannot be other than superstitious.
In this video from the beginning of this year, Žižek is interrogated about his position on a range of current topics by a disembodied voice and video images on the giant screens which surround him. Here he repeatedly approaches this limit. What is interesting, in this encounter with the superstitious limit point of his own action—in this case, his ‘action’ in prescribing any specific course of radical action <in response to global crisis>—is his honesty in effectively admitting: I don’t know what, but here something has to happen.
Slavoj Žižek and the Recycling Superstition
Two weeks ago (Thursday, July 1st 2010) I attended Slavoj Žižek’s lecture at the LSE, marking the release of his new book: Living in the End Times. A podcast of the lecture is available to download here.
The ground covered during his two hours of—near continuous—speech will not surprise anyone familiar with his public performance, nor will his habit of interrupting even himself with further points and deviations.
In this post I will address Žižek’s provocative claim that efforts at personal recycling—‘small everyday acts’—equate simply to a superstition. This was by no means the focus of his lecture—it was little more that a passing comment—but, whether he has any valid grounds for making such a statement or not, a careful examination of this contention is an interesting departure point. This statement also attracted a somewhat puzzled question from an audience member (during the minimal time left for questions at the end of the lecture) and additionally has since been picked up on as an unhelpful or confusing argument in Martin Eve’s blog notes on the lecture here. In his answer to the audience member’s question, Žižek associated his position with an anecdote he has told on several occasions concerning Starbucks’ claims of a benefit to poor coffee growing communities being built in to a purchase of their ‘fair trade’ coffee. On this Žižek comments:
In the commodity itself the price of your leftist, honest, resistance to consumerism is included.
In previous lectures (specifically in his RSA lecture of late 2009, available to watch and listen to here) Žižek has also used what I consider to be a clearer example of this point: TOMS Shoes, a US company who, with every purchase made by the consumer, donate a second pair of shoes to a child in poverty in an economically poorly developed country. In these examples Žižek is highlighting a tendency in contemporary consumer capitalism to anticipate the ethical concerns of potential consumers and reverse them, transforming them directly into positive selling points—necessarily at a premium on their less ethical market equivalents with respect to additional costs (such as manufacturing two pairs of shoes), but also potentially as pure ‘added value’, a premium taken solely as profit and paid for by an ethically minded consumer who is happy (or wealthy enough) to pay more for the product’s virtues.
In short, advanced consumer capitalism seeks to recuperate its own negative ethical implications, transforming them into positive commodities that it can sell back to a concerned demographic at a premium.
As a perspective on advanced consumerism, marketing trends and brands, Žižek makes a valid and relevant observation. But, can this be extended—as Žižek appears to be doing—to become a substantive claim about the fundamental nature of advanced capitalism and ‘ethical consumerism’? There are two principle problems with such an extension.
The first is that to make such a claim with certainty, it is necessary to answer both an epistemological and an ontological question in the affirmative. Epistemological—is it possible to make a valid determination about the fundamental ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of the capitalist system as a whole (and also the nature of ethical consumerism as a subset of this larger system)? Only if such an epistemic determination is possible, can we then reason about its ethical nature—to speak simplistically—is it ‘good’ or ‘bad’? The ontological question—is it even valid to consider such entities as possessing a nature or essence in the first place? Only if the system can be said to possess a nature, can ethical judgments regarding this nature be held to be valid judgments about the system. To put these questions more simply and the other way around: does it possess a nature? and can this nature be known (in order to then pass judgement upon it)?
The second problem is philosophically more simple, but still difficult to resolve in any empirically meaningful way; it concerns a misreading of consumers (or at least of a meaningful proportion of consumers) in their motives for buying ethically branded products, assuming that they do so solely purely out of a desire for pleasure, or if not pleasure directly, then at least to avoid feelings of guilt.
This misreading of consumers motives is most striking in another example Žižek gives during his RSA speech. Referring to a consumer’s choice to buy an organic apple costing significantly more, he claims this choice is rooted in the pleasure gained from a feeling of doing something for the environment. This motivation may, amongst others, exist in a great many consumers and in many it might even be the dominant motivation, but to take for granted that this the true cause—‘look deep into yourself’, Žižek asks—is to take at face value the logic of consumerist marketing; which dictates that the association of a product with representations of virtues or desirable attributes is the only motivating factor in determining a consumers’ consumption decisions. I describe this as the ‘logic of consumerist marketing’ because it equates exactly to the ad man’s dream; which is not that the ‘representation of virtues or desirable attributes is <in reality> the only motivating factor’ but simply that everyone comes to believe that it is (which from the point of view of an advertiser is even better—i.e. more cost effective—as it avoids the expense and difficulties of having to deal with real things at all).
Žižek is incorrect in the totality of his assertion about motivation. Firstly, it seems certain that many consumers actually believe that organic apples are healthier and taste better, and therefore are buying them out of more traditional notions of self interest, rather than an association with a wider ethical good. More significant, it is also perfectly possible that some consumers actually buy organic apples because they do—admittedly in some small way—have less of a negative effect on the environment compared with ones produced using (or overusing) synthetic pesticides and fertilisers. This is not the place for an in depth analysis of the pros and cons of farming methods but, whilst ‘synthetic’ should not be considered a synonym of ‘bad’, it is reasonable to assert the rational value of a ‘precautionary principle’ with respect to public health and the surrounding environment when employing methods that enable dramatic intensification of processes and yields through radical breaks with such processes as they are found in nature. It is therefore clear that some consumers choose to buy organic apples, not because they get a ‘feel good’ pleasure from doing so, but because they believe that organic apples are the preferable option in terms of their personal impact on the wider environment. In these cases I would argue it is neither seeking pleasure nor avoiding guilt that decides the purchase, but rather a rational decision based on certain assumptions about the relative impacts of organic versus non-organic food production on the environment.
This same misreading of motivation can also be seen with respect to Žižek’s analysis of buying fair trade or apparently ‘ethically positive’ products. It is not necessarily experiencing pleasure in the feeling of doing good, nor an attempted avoidance of the guilt caused by participation in the system of capitalist consumption, which prompts the buying of such goods. Rather, it can be considered to be the result of weighing up a situation where—given the necessity for shoes, the lack of skills, tools and time to make them for yourself, and the reliance on the capitalist system of production and trade which results from this situation—the ethically minded consumer simply chooses the option that appears the least bad. The consumer may not necessarily be making the objectively correct decision, but the position from which they are making their decision is one of ‘ethical problem solving’, rather than a position of seeking pleasure or avoiding guilt.
Similarly, when addressing recycling, Žižek contends that at an individual level recycling cannot be anything more than a superstition, since any single practice of recycling cannot make a meaningful contribution to the efforts necessary to prevent ultimate environmental collapse. Again, this is an oversimplification of personal motivations. It is perfectly possible to be motivated, not from a belief that personal recycling will ward off environmental disaster, but from the belief that it makes a smaller contribution to bringing about this inevitable disaster. (However, it should not be forgotten that reduction and reuse—in that order—are both preferable to recycling. Nor should it be forgotten that—unlike recycling—both of these options are antithetical to an expanding economy based on increasing material consumption.) Wholesale transformation of the system might offer the only true possibility of avoiding catastrophe, but since the individual is unable to mobilise the collective agency necessary for such a transformation, they instead simply choose from actions that are possible. In doing so they do not seek to superstitiously ward off environmental disaster, but rather to take what little action is practically available to them as an individual.
To make a fundamental point: the individual nature of consciousness entails that the locus of moral choice (to the extent that such choice exists as a phenomena of consciousness—i.e. presupposing free will) cannot exist at any level other than that of the individual consciousness. From this stems the tendency of both individuals and society to focus on the importance of the actions of the individual, even when such actions have a negligible impact in and of themselves.
If there is in fact any superstition in personal recycling, then it is actually the same superstition that Žižek himself invokes later in the LSE lecture, when he is picked up on in his use of the ‘royal we’. In answer to this he makes reference to the ‘paradox of the performative’—whereby an action is announced as complete in anticipation of its completion—stating that the ‘we’ he refers to is:
...the ghost that comes, not from the past, but from the future of the left.
In the same spirit, when an individual carries out their everyday recycling, it is perfectly possible to think of this as an act of identification with an expansive future community who act similarly (and on such a mass scale, such recycling efforts would make a difference).
To be fair to Žižek, when he makes these claims regarding ethical consumerism and recycling, he may simply be seeking to highlight the danger that fetishising such activities has the potential to displace real action for a fundamental change in the system. However, he is neither explicit enough in stating this, nor is he able to offer a concrete suggestion of what action individuals should be taking instead.
Žižek has a background in Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian philosophy, two subjects about which I currently have very limited knowledge. I suspect that within Hegelian philosophy he may have found some reason to suppose that he can answer the epistemological and ontological questions I raised earlier; and that, from a perspective of psychoanalysis, he may feel able to justify claims about pleasure as a fundamental motive in decision making, or contend that many decisions are made at an unconscious level and are therefore not subject to rationality or conscious ‘will’. (In fact, on my shelf in front of me as I write this I have his 1992 book, ‘For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor’, which I have not yet read, but I anticipate may address these issues.)
Though he didn’t mention it in this LSE lecture, I am interested in Žižek’s previous references to the revolutionary potential of an ‘materialist theology’. However, in his consideration of the guilt of consumerism—and in using phrases such as, ‘buy your redemption’—Žižek is at times very close to reactivating the Christian notion of sin, with capitalism taking the place of the Devil as a transcendent evil. Again, making such a claim—which appears to depend on establishing the underlying essence of a system—requires answering the ontological and epistemological questions raised earlier. Unless these can be answered it cannot be said that capitalism is evil in essence, nor consumerism sinful, but rather that their evil exists in their negative effects (as much as these can be separated out and attributed to capitalism, as opposed to other human failings).
If it were possible to negate these effects then such a negation would not simply buy off guilt; it would eliminate any need to feel guilty in the first place. ‘Capitalism with a human face’ (as Žižek mentions as seemingly the limits of contemporary left’s imagination) would genuinely be a solution in itself.
This is not to say that such an elimination of negative effects is possible within capitalism. Nor does it prove that radical transformation of the system is not the only way to achieve such an end. It is simply a reminder that whatever remedy may be posed, it will be successful only to the extent that enacting it removes these negative effects (without creating new ones to replace them), rather than through the overthrow of the phantom essence of a system. If radical transformation of the capitalist system is necessary, such a transformation must be immanent—negating the specific evils of the capitalist system in the new system (capitalist or otherwise) that is born from the transformation.
Measured against capitalism defined as a transcendent evil, all individual acts appear superstitious.
All Quiet on the Western Front
Not been much visible activity on this blog for just over a month now. But as of today my @jonathanwaring twitter feed has gone live (now functioning alongside the alias I was already using). My official twitter feed can be found in the sidebar of this blog. I am not very happy with the way they display in this current WordPress theme—tweets aren’t separated very well, and the date/time would ideally be italicised. However, I’ve no plans to mess around with different themes again for a while, so—for now—it is what it is.
Blog-wise, I thought I should keep you updated on the more substantial posts to come. In no particular order, and with no definite dates attached, I’m working on:
‘Scientology and the ARC Triangle: The Value of Systematising'
Systems of thought structure our understanding of reality, and therefore our ability to socially function. A flawed (or totally incorrect) system is better than no system at all—Discuss. (Re: the ARC Triangle, I do think it is one of L. Ron’s better contributions to culture. It may be tautological, but I do think it has something to offer.)
‘What if Hitler was Right: On the Importance of Interrogating Wrong Ideas’ (Erm, working title...)
As humans we spend a lot of time operating within symbolic systems, and as a result we often mistake such symbols for reality (yes, I know this is contentious statement). This results in too much time being spent reacting against symbols, whilst failing to combat the underlying problems. (This is a very big topic, and requires significant further development. So you might not see it for some time. Or you might just get an devil’s advocate polemic. Or I might change my mind and you might never hear anything of this idea again...)
‘Anarchism and Libertarianism’
A comparison and critique of Anarchism (of the political Left) and Libertarianism (of the political Right). Probably too big a topic for one blog post, so it just might have to be part of a series. (I have already written an outline of this, in case you just think these are nothing more than fanciful titles.)
So, there you go folks, plenty for you all to be looking forward too.
L. Ron Hubbard in Drag: Ayn Rand on the Internet
Best restroom graffiti I ever saw in college was, “Ayn Rand is L. Ron Hubbard in Drag.”
The above is a quote from a comments post, spotted while searching for connections between our two current protagonists in the collective Internet culture. There are a couple of other variants dating from 2005 onwards—try searching for the, "Ayn Rand is L. Ron Hubbard in Drag" part. All are posted in comments sections or discussion boards, twice by someone with moniker "nolo" (in March and August of that year), with an instruction to "pass it on" in his/her second post. While there is one 'current' instance from November 2009, in total there are only five (now six) occurrences of this phrase in cyberspace, so it doesn't seem to have become an Internet meme so far. For me that's a pity, as there is a neat poetry in the unification of this pair that feels indicative of the something-not-quite-yet-tangible at the root of my cultural interest in them.
Still, all is far from lost, as a search for +“ayn rand” +“l. ron hubbard” returns 22,000 hits from Google. An entirely unscientific* scan through a few suggests that, for the majority of commentators, the connection rests on their common ground as 'middling writers' and 'cult leaders.'
A 1999 peak (see footnote) in content containing references to the pair appears to be a result of the Modern Library 100 Best Lists. The 'readers' polls' for which returned seven of the top ten 'best 20th Century novels' (polled between July 20 and October 20 in 1998) to either Rand or Hubbard (4-3 to Rand), and four books on or by them in the top ten of the corresponding non-fiction category (polled between April 29 and September 30 in 1999; 4-1 to Rand.) These reader's polls were widely criticised with respect to their value as a representative sample, both as regards the spectrum of people visiting the Modern Library and feeling passionately enough to vote, and the fact that it was possible to vote anew each day, allowing the opinions of the most persistent to hold a greater sway over the results—see The Harvard Crimson (1998) for an at-the-time response to the marketing implications of the list for Random House; and The Canadian Association of Journalists (2002) on the poll and Internet polls more generally.
As a native of Britain, one of the striking features of Rand on the Internet is how culturally significant she seems to be to those who grew up in the United States, yet how relatively unknown she is over here. A common theme among US readers is how Rand's ideas attract young teenagers, who become briefly obsessed by them, but are later discarded as they discover other ideas and viewpoints (most self-commentators regarding this as a positive progression and expressing more than a little surprise that they ever took her so seriously). A summary of the (pejorative) 'European perspective' on Rand might be:
communicator wrote:
Oct. 11th, 2007 01:36 pm (UTC)"Almost every major political and intellectual figure of the last 25 years has said, in an interview some time, that the seminal moment of their life was when they read Atlas Shrugged"
I'll take your word that this is the case within the USA. Everywhere else most people haven't even heard of it, let alone read it, and where it is known it is regarded with almost universal contempt. I don't think contempt is too strong a word. I think one of the biggest revelations to Europeans from using the Internet is finding out how this twaddle is taken seriously in America.
My first encounter with Rand was via the references in Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson's The Illuminatus! Trilogy, which I read in 2007 (many years after I ceased being a teenager) on the recommendation of my girlfriend. At the time she recounted her secondhand encounter with Rand, which seems to have more in common with a US experience. Whilst working at a summer job in a warehouse during university, she met a longtime worker there, who—on discovering that she was studying philosophy—told her that she absolutely had to read Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead, as they were life changing philosophical experiences. I am left to assume one of the following: as a 'rational egoist' he had decided that his work was his highest value and was truly devoted to being the best warehouseman possible; he was waiting out his time to realise his designs as great architect, artist etc.; or he was Charles Freck. Suffice as to say, my girlfriend looked up Ayn Rand and decided not to bother.
I'll end this post with links to a website I don't visit nearly as often as a should (given how much pleasure it gives me): Uncyclopedia, who (obviously) manage to get 'Elrond' into the Ayn Rand page.
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*Footnote: In doing this search I have just discovered Google's 'time line' search view. This informs me that the peak of content containing references to both Rand and Hubbard was created across 1998-2001 (with the peak in 1999), with smaller peaks across 1987-1990 and 2007-2008 respectively. However, this is from a very cursory inspection and it would not surprise me if these peaks are relative to the 'size' of the Internet at the time, rather than representing absolute numbers. I will return to this search in future, with the benefit of some further research into how Google works this kind of thing out (maybe I'll get the hang of 'Google Analytics' at the same time...) —Further to this it now seems that the time line relates to pages that are 'timestamped' in some way, returning a large number of online newspaper articles.
Current research: Ayn Rand and L. Ron Hubbard
L. Ron Hubbard c.1968
Ayn Rand c.1957
I am in the process of researching the conceptual systems and philosophies of 'dubious' thinkers—particularly those who have been successful in spreading their ideas into popular culture. Currently my research is focused on, and is interested in contrasting, the ideas and writings of Ayn Rand (founder of the 'philosophy' of Objectivism, through which she claimed to have proved that laissez-faire Capitalism could be the only 'moral' political system, and which she promoted through the fictional novels 'The Fountainhead' (1943) and 'Atlas Shrugged' (1957), both of which were a popular and commercial success) and L. Ron Hubbard (science fiction writer turned founder of the 'new religious movement' Scientology, whose conceptual schema—expressed through a prolific and verbose output—have left their mark on the contemporary world, both inside and outside of Scientology). My interest in these figures comes in part from an an interest in personal systems of thinking and action, but in the main from their ability—despite their many shortcomings—to reach out and affect the lives and thinking of 'everyday people', rather than having their initial effects only in technical and specialised areas of academia.
I am also interested, in a very simple way, in the way they both made a living through their work. I think this is one area where these research interests clearly intersect with the realm of an 'art practice', particularly one which is functional and aims to enact or 'do something' in the world, rather than being simply representational.
What this website is not:
This website is not—and is not intended to become—a 'menu' of artworks for easy consumption.
BPC (2009)
Getting the look of this blog right is going to prove a challenge
I've now tried out a variety of WordPress themes and I'm not really happy with any of them. All those I've installed have had at least one attribute in their favour, but then they've all then had more things going against them. I don't really want to get bogged down editing themes (or getting into php, css, xhtml and the like), as that is not really what I am here for.
However, the current available options are not acceptable.